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Current cloud and network infrastructures do not employ privacy-preserving methods to protect
their assets. Anonymous credential schemes are a cryptographic building block that enables the
certification of data structures and prove properties over their representations without disclosing the
innards of their data structures in zero-knowledge. The GRaph Signature (GRS) scheme devised
by [19, 20] enables the certification and proof methods to sign infrastructure topologies represented
as graph data structures and use zero-knowledge to prove properties over their certificates. As
such, they represent a powerful privacy-preserving method that proves properties over a signed
topology graph to another party without disclosing the blueprint of its topology. In this paper, we
report our efforts in designing, implementing and benchmarking a Graph Signature Library (GSL).
GSL is a cryptographic library realized in Java that implements the graph signature scheme. GSL
enables application developers to create novel applications and services using graph signatures. We
discuss the design decisions that were made during the development of the library. GSL is based on
a layered architecture that abstracts the implementation details of the underlying cryptographic
scheme allowing the easy integration with other cryptographic schemes. We discuss a number of
valuable lessons we learned during the development of the cryptographic library. We present the
testing methodology that we followed for this library and how we ensure that there is not any
information leakage of sensitive information. We evaluate the applicability of this library using
graph topologies that represents a cloud infrastructure using a variety of configurations in terms of
vertices and edges. The performance of the library is evaluated using benchmarks that show that
the library has comparable performance to other RSA-based implementations.
1 INTRODUCTION
Anonymous credentials enable different parties to have privacy-protected communications in
various domains such as cloud computing and IoTs. Design and implementation of anonymous
credentials such as idemix [12] and U-Prove [35] takes a lot of effort, mainly due to the
complexity of the underlying protocols that are used.
The graph signature scheme devised by Gross [19, 20] allows an auditor A to certify
infrastructure topologies such as a cloud infrastructure topology of a cloud provider (CP),
and a prover P that assures a verifier V of policies regarding the infrastructure in zero-
knowledge proofs without disclosing the blueprint of the infrastructure. For instance, a cloud
tenant who acts as the verifier requests the cloud provider who acts as the prover to prove in
zero-knowledge if her VMs are isolated or belong to a particular geographical location such
as a country. The scheme is based on a signature scheme and corresponding honest-verifier
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge on graphs. Privacy-preserving techniques are used in a
variety of domains from cryptocurrencies to cloud computing and Internet of Things (IoT).
Proving properties of an infrastructure that is represented as a graph without disclosing the
details of the infrastructure in zero-knowledge has the potential of creating new computing
paradigms where the privacy and confidentiality goals take central role.
In this paper, we propose GSL, the Graph Signature Library, a Java library for realizing the
graph signature scheme. The library provides an API for creating different proof components
and orchestrating the protocol stages for the graph signature scheme. The library provides an
encoder that can encode arbitrary graph topologies using a graph encoding scheme according
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to the use case. For instance, we are using geo-location separation as an example of an
encoding scheme. Each vertex label encodes a particular country that represents the location
of the actual vertex. Using a flexible and easy to understand API the developer is able to
make choices that will not create an insecure implementation.
Therefore, it is of paramount importance to ensure that the cryptographic library is
developed in a way that follows the design goals we define.
1.1 Contributions
We offer the first realization of the graph signature scheme implemented in the Java
programming language. We present the architecture of the library that uses a novel approach
on creating orchestrators to coordinate reusable components for the fulfillment of zero-
knowledge proofs. We showcase how design patterns can be leveraged to design anonymous
credentials libraries and the importance of creating a specification document for cryptographic
algorithms that matches the implementation of low-level cryptographic primitives. We discuss
the variety of testing methods of the library in terms of information flow, static analysis
and coverage. We develop a number of benchmarks for each stage of the cryptographic
scheme to evaluate the performance of the library in terms of different encryption keys
and size of the graph topology. The performance evaluation measures the execution time of
the proof components during the issuing, proving and verification stages. In addition, we
discuss lessons learned throughout the development of the first cryptographic library that
implements the GRS scheme, which application developers and users can benefit.
Outline: We organize the rest of the paper as follows. We describe the graph signature
scheme in section 2. Section 3 discusses the design principles driving the architecture of the
GSL. In section 4, we describe the design of the GSL and how we devised its architecture.
Next, we present the details of the implementation of the GRS library in section 5. In
section 6, we present the results from the performance evaluation and the testing of the
library. Section 7 discusses related work to this paper. Section 8 states conclusions and
outlines future research threads.
2 GRAPH SIGNATURES
Graph signatures is a novel signature scheme where a graph structure can use zero-knowledge
proofs to prove properties such as isolation to other parties without revealing any other
information apart from the truth of the property. We now discuss required preliminary
material for graph signatures.
2.1 Preliminaries
Assumptions. The graph signature scheme is based on the Strong RSA assumption [17, 39],
which operates on the special RSA group. The set QRN is the cyclic subgroup of Quadratic
Residues of a special RSA group with modulus N .
Integer Commitments. When the Pedersen commitment scheme [36] operates in a special
RSA group and the committer does not know the factorization of modulus, then the
commitment scheme can be used to commit to integer of arbitrary size [16].
Known Discrete-Logarithm-Based, Zero-Knowledge Proofs. There are several known re-
sults on proving statements about discrete logarithms. For instance the proof of knowledge
of a discrete logarithms modulo [42] a prime or a composite [16, 17].
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures. The graph signature scheme uses the Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya (CL) scheme in a strong RSA setting [11]. It is used to sign hidden messages
and prove knowledge of a signature.
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Table 1. Notation for graph encoding
V Finite set of vertices
E ⊆ (V ×V) Finite set of edges
G = (V, E, tV , tE) Graph
LV ,LE Finite sets of vertex and edge labels
fV : V → P(LV) Labels of a given vertex
fE : E → P(LE) Labels of a given edge
n = |V|,m = |E | Number of vertices and edges
Camenisch-Groß encoding. The Camenisch-Groß [10] encoding manages to encode multiple
binary and finite set values into a single message on the CL message space. The main idea is
to represent binary and finite set attributes using prime numbers. The scheme uses divisibility
and co-primality to establish whether an encoded attribute value exists or not in a credential.
The credential issuer certifies the association between the attribute value and the prime
number.
Graph Encoding. Table 1 provides and overview of the graph encoding notation. Graphs
with finite set of vertices and undirected edges or directed arcs are encoded alongside a finite
set of vertex and edge labels [21]. Each vertex in the graph is represented by a prime number
in credentials and proofs. All prime numbers in this set are pair-wise different. Using the
same approach each label in the graph is assigned a prime number, which acts as a prime
representative. All prime representatives in this set are also pair-wise different.
Integer commitments and CL-signatures encode vertices and edges into their exponents,
which makes the exponents accessible to proofs over the exponents. The association of the
bases with the vertices and edges is randomized. The encoding of a graph involves the
following process. The product of the prime number associated with the vertex or edge
and the prime representatives of the associated labels is calculated and then encoded as an
exponent of a vertex or edge base.
Signatures on Committed Graphs.
The graph signature scheme creates commitments over a graph and proves predicates over
the graph structure with a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
3 DESIGN PRINCIPLES
In this section we outline the main design principles that guide us throughout the design
and development of the graph signature library. Even though, design and implementation
of a cryptographic scheme is considered a difficult endeavor having a specific set of design
principles to guide us throughout the development of the library is always helpful and
produces better quality software.
Before we begin discussing the design principles for GSL we motivate our reasoning
behind choosing the Java programming language for developing the library. First, the Java
programming language caters for development of large and complex software projects by
using a large standard library, garbage collection and memory management without using
pointer logic. Second, Java can be run on a plethora of operating systems and hardware
platforms. Third, there is a number of cryptographic libraries already implemented in
Java. For instance, idemix is a library that implements anonymous credentials in Java. In
addition, Java provides the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) [33] API with the Java
Development Kit (JDK) where multiple providers can be used such as the Bouncy Castle
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cryptographic library [31]. Finally, Java provides the Java Native Interface (JNI) [34] which
enables developers to call native code that is optimized to the specific hardware and software.
This approach can further optimize the performance of cryptographic operations. In addition,
using JNI other libraries and applications that use native code can be integrated with the
Java code.
Security - hard to misuse API One salient feature that cryptographic libraries need to
address is giving the user of the library minimal ways of using the API without misusing
the parameters for each function call. This enables the user to avoid using the API only
with the intended way. For instance, there are not many options in the library both in the
operation of the graph signatures and in the encoding of graphs.
Usable API The library provides a simple API that developers can use. We calculate a
number of complexity metrics to quantify the usability of the cryptographic library.
Extensible GSL makes it accessible to developers to add new cryptographic schemes and
group implementations into the lower level. There is also the ability to add new graph
encoding schemes according to the context the library operates.
Parameterizable Allows for easy customization of parameters that govern the operation of
the cryptographic library. This means that changing the system parameters both for the key
generation, graph encoding and signature scheme is straightforward. We use configuration
files that exist outside of the main source code to further improve the manageability of the
parameters.
Agile Ability to deprecate older schemes or algorithms that are broken or inefficient. In
addition, a developer can use the GSL API to create graph signatures using different settings
such as different key length and topology graph configuration.
Interoperable The library is available to run in many platforms and can exchange messages
with different platforms. Using Java programming language ensures that the library can be
used in a variety of platforms.
Modular The library encompasses small components that use design patterns and realize
proof components and orchestrators for the issuing, proving and verifying stages of the graph
signature scheme.
Abstraction GSL incorporates abstractions over cryptographic groups for QRN , the special
RSA group with modulus N and abstractions over generators and group elements antici-
pating that in the future we can add more group and group element abstractions such as
configurations for elliptic curves and bilinear pairings.
Safe defaults The library embeds safe defaults with 2048 RSA key lengths and appropriate
default parameters for the graph encoding scheme and the signature scheme. Using safe
defaults developers can improve their development time integrating GSL with their own
application and services.
Well documented and specified The library is well documented by providing detailed
Javadocs that explain the behaviour of classes and methods. In addition, a detailed specifi-
cation document [22] is provided that details the low level cryptographic algorithms needed
to realize the graph signature scheme.
Performance A detailed performance evaluation is executed to show if the library performs
in par with other RSA-based cryptographic schemes.
ReusableWe expect that components developed can be used in future implementations and
support different cryptographic primitives such as elliptic curves or reusing proof components
for the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
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4 DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE
In the following we discuss the design of the cryptographic library and motivate the design
choices for this library. First, we outline the main layers of the architecture. Second, we
discuss the graph encoding process and the design patterns we used to realize an abstract
way of encoding graphs that employ an arbitrary encoding scheme.
4.1 GSL Design
We outline the design for the GSL in four conceptual layers from bottom to top. The first
layer is comprised of low-level primitives such as functions that generate random numbers
and primes, compute the Chinese remainder theorem and the Jacobi symbol etc. The second
layer consists of functions related to supporting the graph encoding scheme and configuring
the GSL. The third layer includes the functionality that realizes the graph signature protocol
employing the required parties such as the signer, recipient, prover and verifier. Finally,
the fourth layer consists of the orchestration and communication layer that coordinates the
different parties and sends messages between the parties during the execution of a proof
instance for the graph signature scheme.
4.1.1 Layer 1 - Low-level primitives. The first layer of the GSL consists of the main cryp-
tographic primitives used for the realization of the graph signature scheme. We opted
to implement all the required cryptographic primitives from scratch without integrating
third-party libraries and code. This results in self contained components that implement the
required low-level cryptographic operations for the graph signature scheme.
There are seven main computations that are addressed in this layer. First, the special RSA
modulus is generated for the graph signature schemes. Second, the random safe prime are
generated which are required for the special RSA modulus. Third, the commitment group and
its generators are computed. Fourth, the computations related to group structures and their
group elements when we know factorization of the modulus or not. Fifth, another function
that belongs to this first layer is the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) computation. Sixth,
the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) is computed in this layer. Finally, the Jacobi
symbol is computed in this layer, which evaluates if a group element is part of QRN .
4.1.2 Layer 2 - Encoding and Configuration. The second layer deals with the graph encoding,
configuration, naming and storage of the GSL. The encoding functionality in this layer focuses
on how the encoding scheme is represented and applied to a particular graph. Each encoding
scheme is configured via an external file which specifies the structure of the encoding scheme.
The library is also configured using a main configuration file that specifies all the required
parameters for the graph signature scheme. The parameters required are presented in a table
in the specification document [22]. Alongside this layer is the functionality that provides the
naming for the different elements of the graph signature scheme. The naming facilities are
used in the storage functionality for reading and writing members of a proof that a party
during the execution of the graph signature scheme creates or consumes.
4.1.3 Layer 3 - Graph Signature Protocol. The third layer realizes the main functionality for
the graph signature scheme and especially the related parties. There are four parties for the
graph signature scheme. First, the signer is the party to compute the key generation and the
signing of committed graphs. Second, the recipient is responsible for initiating the signing
process in the interactive protocol and completing the signature for the graph. Third, the
prover main tasks are to compute the proof of possession and vertex and edge decomposition
of the graphs alongside the prover’s part of the pair-wise different proofs. Finally, the verifier
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aims to verify zero-knowledge proof of knowledge originating from the prover with respect
to the signer public key and the policy predicate for what statement to verify.
In addition to the parties in the graph signature schemes there are proof components that
compute parts of the proofs. In an interactive setting there is proof component for each
member of the proof instance. For instance, one component computes the prover side of the
proof that pertains to the component and the other component computes the verifier side of
the proof. There are four types of the proof components. First, are the proof components
that evaluate if the key generation elements were computed correctly. Second, the proof
components related to proving and verifying commitments for the issuing and proving stages.
Third, the pair-wise difference proof components for proving pair-wise difference over vertices.
Finally, the proof components related to proving possession of a graph signature.
4.1.4 Layer 4 - Orchestration and Communication Layer. This layer focuses on the orchestra-
tion of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and the communication of messages to between
members of the proof protocol. The orchestrator components act as coordinators that manage
the related proof components for a particular proof protocol. There are orchestrators that
manage the execution of the issuing the graph signature and proving properties over the
graph. Each orchestrator coordinates the execution of its side and also the message to send
to the other party of the zero-knowledge protocol. For instance, during the proving and
verifying stages of the graph signature scheme there is an orchestrator that coordinates the
prover components and another orchestrator for the verifier components.
In addition to the orchestrators, there are components that focus on the communication
between the parties during the execution of protocol stage. Depending on how the communi-
cation needs to be established, a messaging component can be wired to send the protocol
message using different methods, which can be synchronous or asynchronous. So one party
will send its message while the other one will be waiting for the message and will send back
the reply after processing the message and executing the required computations.
4.1.5 Design Patterns. We used a number of design patterns [38] to further improve the
modularity and flexibility of the library. Using design patterns for the development of
cryptographic libraries creates reusable software which act as building blocks for more
complex system architectures [18]. Especially when the cryptographic library needs to
be integrated with other systems or libraries. By using design patterns we were able to
communicate the structure and behaviour of the software implementation in an abstract
way. The stakeholders of the project, which may not have a large experience in software
engineering, improved their understanding of the intended software design. This has also
been witnessed in large-scale software development projects [41] in industry. The main
design patterns for the design process of the GSL include the Proxy, the Facade, the Abstract
Factory, Iterator and the Dependency Injection (DI) design pattern [37].
The Proxy pattern was used to be able to switch to alternative communication protocols
for the execution of the two party interactions for the participants of the graph signature
scheme first for issuing a graph signature and then to prove properties to a remote verifier.
Currently, the communication channel between the two parties can be either socket-based
or HTTP-based. There is also the option of a local channel mainly to facilitate the testing
of the library. The local channel mode can only be used for the testing of the library. The
main advantage of the Proxy pattern is the hiding of the implementation details from the
client, which makes the future change, test and reuse of the implementation easier.
The Facade pattern provides a unified interface for the low level cryptographic algorithms
implemented in the library. This patterns supports loose coupling and hides the complex
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Fig. 1. Overview of the GSL architecture
details by exposing a simple interface to client code. Using this approach different subsystems
can be used anticipating future change in the library. For instance, we intend to add an
Elliptic Curve subsystem for the graph signature library.
Another design pattern used in the GSL is the Factory pattern which delegates the decision
of which class to instantiate encapsulating the selection logic. This pattern enables the
application developer that uses this library to choose which class will be used for the
application. For instance, in GSL we can select which component will implement the required
low-level number theoretic algorithms. Currently, we instantiate the RSA-based component
when we need to perform low-level computations. In the future, we anticipate another
component that will implement the required Elliptic Curve or Bilinear Pairing algorithms,
which the application developer can select if it is needed.
Iterators is a design pattern that provides a mechanism to access elements of a composed
object in a sequential way without exposing its underlying representations. This pattern
was used to traverse the base collection when we computing zero-knowledge proof protocols
during the issuing, proving and verifying stages of the graph signature scheme. The added
facility of the iterators enable different traversal schemes according to the computation
context. For instance, when we are computing the pre-signature Group Element Q we traverse
both vertex and edge bases creating only one iterator instance. When we are computing
witness randomness for the proof of possession we require only to traverse the vertex bases or
the edge bases since the witness randomness will have different canonical name for vertices
and edges. This way we conveniently store and retrieve the message randomness as required
by the proof protocols.
Dependency Injection is used in the GSL when instantiating a new orchestrator which
coordinates the communication channel and the interactions between the proof components
required for realizing a particular proof protocol. By using constructor dependency injection
in this instance, we promote loose coupling between components and it can be easier to
extend the orchestrator with new types of communication channels in the future if needed.
While designing the different components of the library we realized that there should
be an entity that would coordinate the components that realize a zero-knowledge proof
protocol and the communication between the two parties in each stage of the protocol.
For instance, during the issuing stage we would need to coordinate the protocol and the
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eu.prismacloud.primitives.zkpgs
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(a) The class hierarchy of Groups in the
GSL
eu.prismacloud.primitives.zkpgs
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crypto
C CommitmentGroupElement
A GroupElement
C QRElement
C QRElementN C QRElementPQ C QRElementPQDlog
(b) The class hierarchy of GroupElements in the GSL
Fig. 2. The hierarchy of Groups and GroupElements in the crypto package.
interactions between the issuer and the recipient and during the proving stage between the
prover and verifier. We created a design structure that first coordinates the execution of the
proof components according to the particular proof protocol and at the same time managing
the communication of the messages to the other party such as sending proof signature and
nonces. We call this design entity an orchestrator.
4.2 GSL Architecture
Figure 1 depicts the building blocks of the graph signature library. The lower level compo-
nents comprise the cryptographic basis upon the graph signature scheme is realized. The
components on the above layer focuses on the encoding of arbitrary graphs topologies. The
utilities layer introduces auxiliary components that are used throughout the library and
provide storage, naming, parametrization and communication functionality. The higher level
components are part of the zero-knowledge protocol engine that aims to coordinate the
interactions between the different parties and the execution of the proof protocols.
Crypto base. The lower layer introduces the main cryptographic algorithms required to
realize the graph signature scheme. These are shown in Figure 4. This layer includes the
groups and group elements for the graph signature scheme alongside the key generation
algorithm. Another component in this layer is related to the graph encoding schemes that the
library requires to encode a graph. The main low-level cryptographic algorithms for the GSL
include the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) algorithm, the Jacobi symbol, the Extended
Euclidean algorithm (EEA), the special RSA modulus and the algorithm for generating safe
primes. The specification for each of these low-level cryptographic algorithms can be found
in the following technical report [22].
Different groups are supported for the graph signature scheme depending on the user
knowing the factorization of the modulus and using this information to speedup computations.
We design the group components in a hierarchy which can support other groups needed for
future extensions to the graph signature scheme. Using this approach we create an elegant
design to support multiple group and group element specifications using a hierarchy, which
can be reused and extended. For instance, when we don’t know the factorization of the
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Fig. 3. Using the facade design pattern for the RSA-based subsystem for the low-level cryptographic
algorithms and groups
modulus then all computations are executed in the Quadratic Residues group Z ∗n (QRGroupN).
When we know the modulus factorization we work on the QRGroupPQ. The CommitmentGroup
is used to constrain the commitment computations in a particular group.
Regarding group elements supported for the graph signature scheme, they include the
QRElementN for using elements that are part of the QRGroupN when we don’t know the
factorization of the modulus. When we know the factorization of the modulus we use the
QRElementPQ. The QRElementPQDlog element is used when we know the discrete logarithms
and the modulus factorization. Using this approach we can speedup the computations.
Commitments use the CommitmentGroupElement for these computations.
Currently, the graph signature scheme works only on RSA-based creation of graph
signatures. We consider the integration of graph signature scheme with elliptic curves as
future work. The way we have designed the graph signature library allows us to incorporate
elliptic curves as a subsystem in the crypto base that would focus on cryptographic algorithms
for pairings and elliptic curves. This research thread will give graph signatures the ability to
decrease the time of generating keys, since elliptic curves require a smaller key length to
support the same security level as RSA-based schemes. Graph signatures based on elliptic
curves and pairings would be more efficient and could be used in a variety of scenarios where
efficiency is required such as embedded devices and the Internet of Things (IoT).
Utilities. The utilities layer includes components that assist the library to realise the zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge proofs for the graph signature scheme. The main components in
this layer are the ProofStorage, the Naming and Messaging. The goal of the first component
is to provide a storage facility for each member of the proof protocol that can store and
retrieve data related to the proofs. The second component introduces a naming scheme
based on Uniform Resource Names (URNs) [15] that each party can use to uniquely identify
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Crypto Utils
CRT Jacobi EEA SafePrime SpecialRSAMod
Fig. 4. The low-level cryptographic algorithms implemented for the realization of the graph signature
scheme
the information stored in the ProofStorage and retrieve it for subsequent proofs. The third
component provides the communication interface that each party can use during the protocol
execution to send the required proof data to the correspondent party.
ZKPoK Protocol Engine. This layer includes the components required for realizing
the zero-knowledge protocols and proofs for the graph signature scheme. There are four
components that resemble the different parties that need to interact with each other and
fulfill the requested proof. The Signer component is responsible for the key setup and the
signing of the committed graphs. The Recipient component initiates the signing process
and completes the graph signature. The Prover component is responsible for the proof of
possession for the graph signature. The Verifier component aims to verify zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge originating from the Prover component taking into account the signer
public key and the proof request. The Orchestrators of each party coordinate the execution
workflow of the proof protocol for the graph signature scheme.
4.3 Encoding A Graph
In this subsection, we outline the process of encoding a graph and the design choices made
during the development of the library. The graph encoding is based on the prime encoding
introduced by Groß and Camenisch [10]. The workflow of encoding a graph in GSL is depicted
in Figure 5. The graph encoding workflow requires three inputs. The initial input is the
GraphML [7] file, which specifies the vertices, edges and labels of the topology graph. The
file is imported by the library and instantiates an interim graph data structure to represent
the GraphML file. The graph data structure is the first input to the encoder component. The
second input is the extended public key that was previously generated during the extended
key generation process. The extended public key consists of the bases for vertices and edges
according to the graph encoding parameters. The third input is the graph encoding scheme
that contains the information on how to encode the graph. For instance, if we are encoding
graphs with geolocation information, then the encoding scheme contains the mapping of
labels for a particular country to a corresponding prime number as discussed in [20].
The encoder component is responsible for encoding the created graph data structure
and for encoding random bases from the extended public key. The process of encoding
the graph data structure is illustrated in Figure 6. The steps for encoding the graph data
structure involves two main steps. During the first step the encoding is setup and we generate
vertex representatives and we retrieve the mapping of the labels from the graph encoding
scheme. The second step we map vertex and label strings to prime representatives which
will be passed to the second phase of the encoding. The output of this phase is the graph
representation. This data structure references a particular vertex and label to particular
prime representative. The graph representation created is passed to the second phase of the
encoder.
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Fig. 5. The graph encoding workflow
During the second phase of encoding a graph we input the graph representation and the
extended public key. The process of this phase is depicted in Figure 7 The goal of this phase
is to encode vertices and edges on uniformly random selected bases from the extended public
key. We first encode vertices and we encode each vertex by first uniformly random selecting
a vertex base Rπ (i) and then computing the exponent for the selected vertex base as depicted
in Figure 7. A similar process is followed for encoding edges. For each edge we select a
random edge base Rπ (i, j) and then we compute the exponent for the edge base. The final
output of the encoding process is the encoded random bases for vertices and edges that hold
the exponent for a random vertex or edge.
4.4 Lessons learned
During the iterative process of designing the architecture of GSL we learned a number of
valuable lessons, which are of further interesest to the developers of cryptographic libraries
and to the research community. We first discuss what we learned from creating a conceptual
layered design and using an iterative pattern-based design process for the GSL.
Designing complex software systems using a hierarchy of different levels of abstraction
which incorporate encapsulation and information hiding results in quality architecture
designs [4, 30]. Thus, during the design process of the cryptographic library we separated the
architecture of the library in different layers according to the goal of each set of components.
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Fig. 6. Stage 1: The process of encoding the graph data structure
We opted for using design patterns to ensure that we use proven solutions for problems
that arise during the design and implementation of cryptographic libraries. Our main aim
was not to reinvent the wheel. Developing a new cryptographic library from scratch is a
challenging endeavor and leveraging design patterns can ameliorate the difficulty of the task.
Even though not every problem can be solved with a design pattern it was helpful to know
that there are options that we could amend to our design and that we can also introduce
our own specific design elements to the architecture of the library.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we discuss the implementation of the graph signature library and provide
further details on components of the architecture. First, we discuss how the key generation
functionality was implemented. Second, we outline the classes that are part of the utility
package and provide auxiliary methods to the GSL. Third, we describe how the graph encoding
was implemented. Finally, we discuss the classes and interfaces that are part of the core
protocol layer.
Before we start discussing the details of the implementation we briefly motivate the reasons
behind choosing the version of Java. For the implementation of the graph signature scheme
we used version 1.8 of Java to ensure compatibility with other applications and libraries that
would like to make use of the graph signature library. The implementation of BigIntegers in
Java provide a solid base upon to implement cryptographic
Configuration. The graph signature library can be parameterized in two ways. The first
is using a JSON1 file that holds the configuration of the parameters to realize the graph
signature scheme. The list of parameters include system and group parameters required for
the key generation and proofs for issuing and verifying. In addition, a separate file includes
the parameters for the graph encoding scheme. All these parameters are defined in the
library specification document.
1JavaScript Object Notation, http://www.json.org
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Fig. 7. Stage 2: The process of encoding random bases
Library specification. We implemented the library in close tandem with the library spec-
ification document [22]. This way the implemented cryptographic algorithms and proof
protocols closely match those defined in the specification document. In addition, the specifi-
cation document can provide the basis for implementing the graph signature scheme in a
different language such as C++ or Python.
5.1 Key Generation
The key generation functionality in the graph signature library is implemented using a
range of classes and interfaces. The main classes that implement the key generation is
the SignerKeyPair and the ExtendedKeyPair. The former generates the RSA key pair for
the signer according to the key generation parameters and the latter instantiates a new
extended key pair with the default option of a geo-location graph encoding scheme. The
ExtendedKeyPair class also generates the bases for vertices and edges that will be used to
encode the graph representation. For each key pair class there are two classes implementing
the public and private keys. The SignerPublicKey class creates a new signer public key and
also adds the contents of the public key to context of the challenge required in computing
the challenge during proof execution. The private key of the signer is implemented with
the SignerPrivateKey class. The extended public key instantiates a new extended public
key attaching the bases, the graph encoding scheme and the graph encoding parameters. In
addition it computes the current challenge context and setups the graph encoding.
There is a generic interface IKeyPair that returns the underlying base key pair. For
instance, the ExtendedKeyPair will return the SignerKeyPair
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5.2 Utilities
The utilities are placed in the util package. The main utilities in this package include classes
implementing common functionality required from classes during the execution of proofs.
The Assert implements common precondition checks for methods and constructors. Using
this class we can evaluate if an object parameter is null or not, check if the string is empty
and checking the length of a BigInteger number. There is also a utility class that displays
and diagnoses the structure of a graph representation named GraphUtils. This class is used
as a debugging tool during development.
Another set of utility classes implement the URN scheme required for identifying elements
in a proof and in the proof storage. There is also the GSUtils class that implements low-level
cryptographic computations such as generating prime numbers and random numbers or
computing the hash required during the computation of the challenge
The ProofStore class implements a storage mechanism which is predominantly memory
based. The goal of this class is to provide methods for storing and retrieving data related to
proofs. Each element in the proof store is saved using its unique URN key identifier which
can then be used to retrieve the information.
5.3 Graph Encoding
The GSL incorporates an interface for realizing graph encoding schemes called IGraphEn-
coding. It is an interface that is used to derive classes implementing encodings for graph
representations. The goal of the encoding is to map vertex and label strings to prime numbers
that represent them in later stages of the graph signature scheme. An example encoding
implementation is provided with the GSL. The GeoLocationGraphEncoding class implements
a graph encoding scheme that holds the geo-location of vertices using the structure of the
UN ISO-3166 [26] alpha country codes.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss the methods we used for evaluating the GSL. First, we present the
methods regarding testing and validation of the graph signature library. Second, we discuss
the results from the performance evaluation of the library.
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6.1 Library Testing and Validation
The GSL was tested and validated using a variety of methods. First, we tested the behaviour
of each class and method following the unit testing [25] paradigm. We also performed
integration testing for each proof protocol that involves both parties. The validation of
library consists of analyzing the source code using static analysis code tools and evaluating
the dependencies of the library.
Unit testing. We developed the test cases with the JUnit [27] library version 5.5.2 to
ensure the cryptographic algorithms and proof protocols are working correctly. There are
382 test cases that execute successfully. The test cases cover all the classes required to realize
the graph signature scheme. The test coverage is 79% of the source code.
Another feature that facilitates the testing of the GSL is the introduction of a signing
oracle that outputs graph signatures computed in a non-interactive way without the need for
a recipient party. The main input to the signing oracle is a valid signer or extended key pair.
The oracle can create graph signatures with a uniform random blinding randomness and a
given graph representation encoded with a particular graph encoding scheme. According
to the requirements of the test case the oracle can also create graph signatures on a group
element or on a message m0 without any graph encoding scheme or on a collection of bases.
The flexible design of the signing oracle simplifies testing of the library without depending
on the participation of the recipient to complete the graph signature.
Static Code Analysis. We used a combination of three static code analysis tools to
uncover critical bugs in the codebase. It has been shown that using multiple static code
analysis tools can act complementary to each other for uncovering bugs in software [24].
SpotBugs2, Facebook’s Infer [9] and Google’s error-prone [1] are the three tools for analyzing
the GSL codebase.
During the development and testing phase we analyzed the codebase using SpotBugs
static code analysis tool version 3.1.12. This enabled us to improve the quality of the source
code and avoid a variety of code smells.
The Infer static code analysis tool performs inter-procedural analysis and reports a variety
of software issues such as null pointer exceptions and resource leaks. We have run this tool
during the testing of the library to ensure there aren’t any issues.
error-prone is build on top of javac compiler to check java code and presents the outcome
of the static analysis as compilation errors. The advantage of this tool is that it reports only
critical bugs without presenting a large number of warnings. In addition, error-prone results
include a potential fix to the issue reported. We have successfully used this tool during the
later stages of development and during testing to ensure that no critical bugs exists in the
codebase of the library.
Dependency Analysis. We used the OWASP dependency check [28] tool to evaluate
the dependencies of the graph signature library and if they include any publicly disclosed
known vulnerabilities. Currently, there aren’t any vulnerable libraries bundled with the
GSL. This was achieved by including only a minimal set of dependencies in the library and
implementing as much functionality as possible from scratch. Thus, we didn’t require to add
many libraries to realize the graph signature scheme.
Information Flow. We also tested that the classes used for the proof protocols do not
leak any information during their execution that would compromise the security of the
2SpotBugs, https://spotbugs.github.io/
0:16 Ioannis Sfyrakis and Thomas Groß
0
100
200
300
512 1024 2048 3072
Key lengthM
ea
n 
ke
y 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
tim
e 
(se
c)
Fig. 9. Mean time for generating the signer keys
graph signature scheme. For instance, we want to ensure that the group elements do not
leak the factorization of n. For this reason we first evaluate if the group element can be cast
to a group element that would leak primes p and q. Another check is if the group of the
element leaks a group that knows the factorization of n. If the generator of the group leaks
private information and if the group leaks the group order. These tests are contained in the
InfoFlowUtil class.
We now discuss which specific parts of the library were tested for leakage of private
information according to the above mentioned tests. First, the testing of the commitments
component evaluates if the commitment value computed leaks any private information.
Another check in this component is the testing of the base collection in a commitment that
each group element that represents the base is assured that it does not leak any private
information. If that is the case, then a malicious party could recreate the commitments
and add his own information to the commitments so that she can compromise the proof
protocols and in extension the graph signature scheme.
Second, the graph representation component includes the encoded bases which are used to
encode the graph topology. We evaluate the encoded bases for information flow leakage by
making sure that each group element that represents an encoded base does not leak private
information. Third, the components for the extended and signer public key are tested for
private information leakage. For the former component we test the auxiliary bases S,Z ,R and
R0, the certified bases for vertices and edges and the group for leaking private information.
For the signer public key we evaluate the same items apart from the certified bases. Fourth,
we ensure that the A group element of the graph signature and the signed encoded bases do
not leak private information. Fifth, for testing prover components we evaluate the group
elements that represent witnesses in the proof protocols if they compromise the flow of
information. Sixth, verification components are tested for information leakage by checking if
bases, witnesses or the graph signature elements A and Q do not expose private information
during the verification process.
Even though the information flow tests were executed during the testing stage of the
GSL, it provides assurances that the code developed does not leak any private information.
However, it would be an improvement, if these checks could be executed during runtime
using pre and post conditions. One way of achieving this is by using the Java Modeling
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Fig. 10. Performance results for the extended key generation which involves generating new bases and
setting up a graph encoding scheme
Language (JML) [13]. JML is a behavioral interface specification language designed for
Java. We consider developing JML specifications to prevent information flow leakages during
runtime [40] as future work.
6.1.1 Lessons learned. The testing and validation of cryptographic libraries requires a lot
of time and effort. In this subsection we discussed our approach to evaluate the GSL. We
believe that a variety of tools and methods should be used to not only test the correctness
of the functionality but assess the fulfillment of security requirements as well. This enables
to uncover as many bugs as possible using a variety of code analysis tools and ensure that
private information will not leak. Another aspect of testing cryptographic libraries is to
create components that can facilitate the testing of a cryptographic scheme. For instance,
we have developed a graph signature oracle to rapidly test the issuing of graph signatures in
a non-interactive way with various configurations.
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6.2 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the GSL by adjusting the key length and the size of the
graph.
6.2.1 Experimental Setup. We used a commodity desktop computer to execute the perfor-
mance benchmarks. The testbed is equipped with a 3.4GHz Intel CoreTM i7–3770 CPU with
8 GB of RAM and a 500 GB hard disk. The operating system used to run the benchmarks is
Ubuntu version 16.04. The Java Microbenchmarking Harness (JMH) [14] framework version
1.22 was used to develop the benchmarks. The YourKit3 Java profiler version 2019.1 was
used for measuring the CPU time for each benchmark. Each test was executed at least 100
times unless other number is specified.
6.2.2 Results.
Key generation. For the key generation experiment we measured how much time the
graph signature library takes to generate a key pair for the signer. The results are illustrated
in Figure 9 and are typical for creating RSA-based key pairs. The fastest option is using a
512-bit key followed by the 1024-bit key and the 2048 and 3072-bit key. The time that it
takes to issue the graph signature is exponential to the bitlength of the key.
3YourKit Java profiler, https://www.yourkit.com/java/profiler/
GSL: A Cryptographic Library for the strong RSA Graph Signature Scheme 0:19
l ll l l l l l l l l
l
l l l l l l l l
Commitment 
 Provers
Possession 
 Prover
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
Graph size (number of vertices)
M
ea
n 
CP
U 
tim
e 
(m
s)
Key Length
l
l
l
l
512
1024
2048
3072
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Extended key generation. For this set of performance experiments we measured the
time it takes to generate the required vertex and edge bases. These are the bases that are
the placeholders for the encoding of the graph. In addition, we measure the time it takes
to setup the geolocation graph encoding. These two processes are part of the extended key
generation.
Issuing. For this performance benchmark we measured the performance of the issuing of
a graph signature. We first measure the time it takes the signer to issue the partial signature
and the recipient to complete the signature. More precisely we measure the time it takes to
compute the modular exponentiations for the issuing of the graph signature. The results are
depicted in Figure 11.
The results show that when we sign a graph with a large number of vertices then the
total issuing time is increased. We also see that the signer’s issuing time is more than the
recipient’s for the same number of vertices and key length. This due to the fact that the
recipient only completes the graph signature to create the final version of the signature. The
key length directly affects the issuing time with a 512 key length having the best performance.
The second best performance for the total issuing time is when the key length is 1024. The
third best performance of the total issuing is when the key length is 2048. Using this key
length is the minimum accepted configuration for using this library in a secure setting. We
also see that this key length increases the issuing time in a higher degree than the issuing
time for 512 and 1024 key lengths.
Proof components. These tests adjust the length of the RSA key and measure the
execution time of each proof component. We measure the mean CPU time for the main proof
components in the graph signature scheme. First we measure the CPU time for the proof
components used during the proving stage and then during the verifying stage. Figure 12
shows the time it takes to execute the commitment provers and the possession prover.
Figure 13 shows the time to execute the commitment verifier and the possession verifier.
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7 RELATED WORK
Cryptographic libraries. In recent years cryptographic libraries have been introduced
that either support a wide variety of cryptographic primitives or support only a limited
set of cryptographic primitives. In the first category of cryptographic libraries includes
the OpenSSL library. OpenSSL [32] provides a complete implementation of cryptographic
primitives. cryptlib [23] is an early attempt of a modular cryptographic library which offers a
generic interface and implements a wide variety of cryptographic primitives. Other libraries
that implement multiple cryptographic schemes include NaCl [6] and Apache Milagro [43].
The second category of cryptographic libraries include libraries that support a specific
cryptographic primitive. For this work, we are interested in cryptographic libraries that
support anonymous credentials and especially attribute-based anonymous credentials that are
related to the graph signature scheme. Identity mixer (IDEMIX) [12] implements anonymous
credentials and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. The Charm framework [2] provides a
method to rapidly prototype cryptographic systems. Other cryptographic libraries focus on
implementing anonymous credentials. The CLARC library implements anonymous credentials
with a reputation system [5]. The IRMA platform [3, 8] implements the IDEMIX attribute-
based credential scheme for android mobiles. The main shortcoming of this work is that
the implementation is not easily portable to other platforms, since it was not designed as
a reusable library. The U-Prove [8, 35] system by Microsoft implements attribute-based
anonymous credentials. Emmy [44] is an open-source cryptographic library that focuses on
trust-enhancing authentication for online services. ZKPDL [29] is a language-based system
for zero-knowledge proofs that implements anonymous credentials for e-cash.
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we have introduced the design and implementation of a cryptographic scheme in
a cryptographic library. We discussed the design and architecture of the library that realizes
the graph signature scheme and discussed the reasons behind our design decisions. During the
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course of the development of this library we learned valuable lessons that can be beneficial
for other developments of cryptographic primitives. We believe that discussing the lessons
learned will assist developers in improving their design and architecture of cryptographic
libraries. The evaluation results show that the library performs on par with other RSA-based
signature schemes. Each proof component exhibit performance that was expected.
Future work entails the integration of an elliptic curve subsystem that would enable the
library to realize a graph signature scheme based on elliptic curves. Such an integration will
truly test the design and architecture of the library. We intend to evaluate the performance
of the elliptic curve subsystem with the RSA one.
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